The primary function of government is to protect the sovereignty of a nation. The most basic form of this protection is security of national borders. This includes not only protection of borders from aggressors but also control of people and goods flowing into and out of the nation. From our earliest days as a nation, the suppression of smuggling was critical to our national survival. In 1790 the Revenue Cutter Service was formed to combat maritime smuggling, ensuring taxes were paid so the fledgling nation would have a source of revenue to survive.
Today illegal drugs, especially cocaine, continue to flow into the United States in massive quantities. While education and rehabilitation programs have made significant headway in reducing the country's thirst for drugs, there remains a substantial drug problem with its associated violent crime. Interdiction programs intended to stem the flow of drugs until education programs and source country programs become effective have been relatively unsuccessful. Additionally, thousands of illegal aliens stream into the United States by land, sea and air daily. Control of smuggling is as critical today as it was over two hundred years ago. The cost of drug use and illegal aliens creates crushing financial burdens on our federal, state, and local governments, as well as on individuals.
The criminal activity associated with illegal alien and drug further burden our national resources. Although other avenues are available, maritime routes are critical avenues consistently used by smugglers.
Maritime law enforcement interdiction operations more closely approximate military operations than conventional law enforcement. The sheer magnitude of the area of operations, the number of major assets employed, the necessity of effective command, control, communication and intelligence, and operational planning all mirror military operational challenges and techniques. The critical nature of the problem and the similarity of operation compel us to look to military operations to see if there are any lessons which can be learned and applied to combating maritime smuggling.
During the same period that maritime interdiction has been relatively unsuccessful in preventing smuggling, the United States has been relatively successful in preventing major regional military conflicts. Military deterrence theory, both nuclear and conventional, is well researched and documented. Effective deterrence in maritime interdiction law enforcement is not well researched nor documented. Can the tenets of military deterrence theory be applied to law enforcement in general and to maritime interdiction law enforcement in particular, improving the deterrence effect on illegal smuggling? This question purposely refers to smuggling in general rather than specifically about drug smuggling. The nature of all smuggling is the same. If deterrence can be applied to one smuggling activity then, in theory, it can be applied to any other smuggling activity, such as illegal aliens or cigarettes.
To answer this question this paper will define maritime interdiction law enforcement by developing a common understanding of its parts. Then it will take a close look at the elements which create conventional military deterrence. Once these two defining pieces are in place it will compare the elements of conventional military deterrence and maritime interdiction law enforcement activity. This comparison will identify similarities and any shortcomings allowing a discussion of these as well as potential solutions. And finally, this will lead to a conclusion about deterrence being a viable strategy for combating maritime smuggling.
MARITIME LAW ENFORCEMENT INTERDICTION
In order to make any comparison between maritime law enforcement interdiction and conventional military deterrence theory we need to have a common understanding of what maritime interdiction is. Simply defined in Webster's, to interdict is to prohibit an action. For the purposes of this paper the action being interdicted refers to the act of smuggling, either drugs or people (but can have universal application to any smuggling act such as attempting to circumvent UN embargoes against Iraq). Maritime interdiction then are those interdictions in the maritime region or simply at sea. This is a broad definition of a much more complex process. To analyze this process it needs to be broken down into its component parts. Maritime Interdiction is a process consisting of a series of activities. These activities are: detection, monitoring, sorting, classifying, boarding, apprehension, and disposition. This process may begin or end at any point and still constitute a successful interdiction. To understand this concept we need to understand each activity that makes up maritime interdiction.
Detection is merely realizing that a vessel or other object is on the ocean.
Detection can occur in many ways. There might be a contact on radar, there might be intelligence from a national asset, or there might be a visual sighting. But detection provides a location of a yet-to-be-identified something.
Once detected, that something out there needs to be monitored. Monitoring is as simple as its sounds. If the detected object was first detected on radar then it will be tracked on radar. If it was identified through a national asset it may be tracked through that asset or it may be acquired by another tracking medium. The Department of Defense has the interagency lead in conducting and coordinating these two activities -detection and monitoring. Early proponents of nuclear weapons have tended to view nuclear deterrence as a self-contained strategy, capable of deterring threats across a wide spectrum of conflict. By contrast, proponents of conventional forces have always argued that there are thresholds below which conventional forces pose a more credible deterrent. Moreover, there will always be nondeterrable threats to American interests that will require a response, and that response, if military, must be commensurate with the levels of provocation. The threat of nuclear weapons against a Third World country, for instance, would put political objectives at risk because of worldwide reactions and the threat of horizontal escalation.
It is the measured response characteristic of conventional military deterrence theory that allows comparison with maritime interdiction law enforcement. There can be no comparability between the mutually assured destruction upon which nuclear deterrence is based and any type of law enforcement. The first element of conventional military deterrence theory, therefore, is its capacity for measured response.
There are two types of military deterrence theory, the first based upon denial, the second on punishment. • Capability -the acquisition and deployment of military forces to carry out plausible military threats to retaliate.
• Credibility-the declared intent and believable resolve to protect a given interest.
• Communication-relaying to the potential aggressor, in an unmistakable manner, the capability and will to carry out the deterrent threat. Dr. Haffa insists that all three of these are critical elements in achieving deterrence, military or any other type.
To summarize, conventional deterrence theory holds that deterrence is created when the following elements are present: (1) the actors involved are rational, (2) there is the capability to make a measured response, (3) either or both denial and punishment are used, (4) there is the capability to respond, (5) there is credibility that a response will occur when provoked and, (6) that the capability and credibility are communicated. But can this theory be applied to maritime law enforcement interdiction? To answer this question we will take each element in turn and see if it exists in maritime law enforcement interdiction.
COMPARISON OF CONVENTION AT. MILITARY DETERRENCE ELEMENTS WITH MARITIME LAW ENFORCEMENT INTERDICTION
What about rational actors? Do smugglers act in a rational manner? Absolutely!
The tremendous adaptations they make in adjusting to improvements in law enforcement techniques, their fierce protection of their territories, the complex organizations they develop -all are indications of rational actors. Smugglers are business men. They are in a business, although illegal, to make a profit. If law enforcement activities reduce their profits they find other ways of doing business to restore profit. If they are unable to circumvent law enforcement activity to restore profit, they either stop doing business or they attempt to eliminate the law enforcement activity.
Can maritime interdiction be measured in its response? Yes, to the degree it has capability. As with conventional military force, any maritime interdiction can be measured. Depending on the level of threat, interdiction assets can be applied commensurately. As with conventional military force, once interdiction assets are engaged in operations against one threat, they are no longer available to provide the same deterrent effect against other threats. Unlike conventional military force, the level of interdiction assets is significantly less than the threat dictates.
Can maritime interdiction law enforcement use both denial and punishment as tools of creating deterrence? Yes, both denial and punishment are usually available in creating deterrence, but not always. Denial is always available. If contraband is found as the result of a boarding, it is confiscated, thereby denying the smuggler the profit of his actions, unless the smuggled cargo is human. In the case of human cargo, the illegal aliens are returned to their point of debarkation, creating a backlog of paid customers for the smuggler, as well as doubts among the clientele of the smuggler's competence.
Additionally the smuggler loses the smuggling platform, in this case a boat or ship.
Punishment can also be an element of maritime interdiction deterrence. The U.S. has developed very severe criminal punishments for illegal smuggling of drugs. These punishments are always available to use against U.S. citizens. As a result they have forced many U.S. citizens out of the actual smuggling activity. However, the same doesn't always hold true in other countries. Often foreign nationals caught and arrested for smuggling are returned to their country, where they may not be punished as severely, or not at all. In the case of smuggling human cargo, it is not always possible to identify the smuggler. They frequently just blend into the cargo and fearful illegal aliens are usually reluctant to identify them to authorities.
In order to have effective conventional military deterrence you must have the capability to respond to the threat. It has been frequently argued in the public forum whether the U.S. military has the capability to respond to two nearly simultaneous Theaters of War today. But there is little or no public debate regarding maritime law enforcement interdiction. It appears in fact that we do not have the capability to quickly eliminate the threat of maritime smuggling. The maritime region is indeed so vast that a credible deterrent capability doesn't exist. There is, however, sufficient capability to create a deterrence in smaller sections of the maritime region. The western Caribbean, due to focused application of resources, has been circumvented by smugglers even though this is the most economical smuggling route. Since it is clear that insufficient capability exists to create a deterrence effect throughout the maritime region, the debate in law enforcement is whether the activities that do occur are of sufficient value to justify their continued operation. Can sufficient resources be brought to bear so maritime interdiction law enforcement would have the capability to respond to the threat?
Probably yes. Is the benefit worth the cost? -welcome to the debate. We'll return to this issue later.
The next element of conventional military deterrence is the credibility to use the capability possessed. It is on the issue of credibility that many historians believe that conventional military deterrence failed and resulted in the Gulf War. The Iraqi leadership did not underestimate the capability of U.S. military forces, but they doubted or were misled about the will of the U.S. to respond to their invasion of Kuwait. In maritime interdiction law enforcement, the issue is moot. If you don't have the capability, there is no way to develop viable credibility.
The final element of conventional military deterrence to consider is communication of capability and credibility. We cannot expect the rational actor to act rationally if he has no knowledge of our capability and of our commitment to use our capability to prevent him from achieving his goal. As with credibility, if there isn't the capability, there is nothing to communicate to those whose actions you wish to deter.
Maritime law enforcement interdiction attracts much of the same criticism as that leveled against conventional military deterrence. Haffa in his article on deterrence notes the considerable criticism that deterrence theory, both conventional and nuclear, has received. This criticism can be summarized in four propositions against reliance on deterrence:
• It is very difficult to prove deterrent successes because that would require showing why an event did not occur (or even to know that an event did not occur).
• The emphasis on the rational calculation of the cost of retaliatory response has also been faulted in deterrence theory( policy makers may pay more attention to their own issues, so they may ignore a cost assessment of their actions).
• Deterrence theory has been criticized for contributing to a spiral of conflict (so the threat of retaliation may trigger a preemptive action on the part of the aggressor).
• Deterrence at conventional levels has tended to "fail" (the author gives several examples for this but for later comparison the most significant is that unless the requirements for deterrence were in place, the theory could not be expected to hold).
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These shortcomings are another comparative element between conventional military deterrence and maritime law enforcement interdiction. In conventional military deterrence theory, it is very difficult to prove deterrent successes because such proof requires showing why an event did not occur (or even to know that an event did not occur). The same is true about maritime law enforcement interdiction. In order to successfully prove deterrence, you need to prove that an event didn't occur. A smuggler chose to ship his product, drugs, people, whatever, by air instead of by sea due to the potential of being caught at sea. The potential cost outweighed the benefit. The only way to clearly ascertain this information is to ask the smuggler. That isn't going to happen, since this is an illegal activity. However, there are some methods of approximating whether smugglers are being deterred. The best would be human intelligence, information gained from informants and undercover agents. There is insufficient humint in law enforcement to confirm or deny that maritime law enforcement is deterring smuggling by sea. A second and almost as reliable method is to monitor smuggling activity in an area. If smuggling seizures (finding contraband on a vessel boarded) become less frequent in response to increased maritime law enforcement activity, we can safely assume that smuggling operations moved somewhere else. The problem here is that one of the most critical measures of successful law enforcement activity is an 13 increased seizure rate. How often have you heard law enforcement agencies justifying increased budgets based on the increased tons of narcotics seized or increased number of illegal aliens captured. These numbers tend to be viewed as showing success and warranting reward. If this is your measure of success, logic would dictate that you don't want to create deterrence, since it causes your seizures go down. So you look less effective by your own measure. The measures of success used in law enforcement in general and maritime law enforcement interdiction in particular tend to discourage creating effective deterrence. If you do create a deterrence in one maritime area with your limited resources, your measure of success (seizures) influences you to move your assets, thereby eliminating your initial deterrent effect. Suffice it to say that using seizures as a measurement of success is an impediment to maritime law enforcement interdiction.
The second criticism leveled against conventional military deterrence is its dependency on the adversary's rational calculation of the cost of retaliatory response. This is precisely the problem in establishing an effective deterrence in maritime law enforcement interdiction. It focuses on the level of resources necessary to produce deterrence, the retaliatory response (including the resources necessary to interdict and punish), not on the effect deterrence would have on the outcome we hope to achieve, a significant reduction in smuggled contraband coming into our country.
Conventional military deterrence theory has been criticized for contributing to a spiral of conflict that is, preemptive attacks by aggressors. This criticism does not apply to maritime law enforcement interdiction. Smugglers tend to be exceptionally adaptive.
14 Frequently, they preempt law enforcement activity by changing their mode of operation in anticipation of law enforcement activity or based on their own intelligence-gathering operations. Smugglers rarely use violence preemptively; rather, they constantly adapt their strategies to circumvent disruptions of the smuggling.
The last major criticism leveled against conventional military deterrence is that conventional deterrence has tended to "fail." This will always be the central focus of any debate on deterrence. As we previously discussed, we cannot "prove" true success of deterrence, so we are left only with evidence of failures. We cannot compare the level of success against failure to see if the return on investment is worth the initial investment.
In the case of maritime law enforcement, we are actually measuring the failures of deterrence -seizures -and calling them successes. Dr. Haffa in "The Future of Conventional Deterrence: Strategies and Forces to Underwrite a New World Order"
points out that if all the elements of deterrence are not in place, we cannot expect the theory to hold. This is especially true for maritime law enforcement interdiction.
The comparison of conventional military deterrence theory to maritime law enforcement interdiction shows that all the necessary elements for deterrence don't exist in maritime law enforcement interdiction. The critical missing element is capability.
Without all the elements we cannot hope to create deterrence. Can we bring the capability necessary to create deterrence into maritime law enforcement interdiction.
Yes, but at what cost?
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DISCUSSION OF CAPABILITY:
The only element of conventional military deterrence that doesn't exist in maritime law enforce interdiction is the capability to create deterrence. Why can't we create the capacity to deter smugglers from bringing their cargoes of contraband to the United States. Two primary factors prevent the development of the necessary capability:
the misconception of the amount of assets necessary to develop the capacity and a lack of conviction.
First let's consider the misconception surrounding capability, the amount of assets, or resources, necessary to create deterrence. Interdiction was earlier described as a series of activities, rather than simply at-sea boarding. This concept of a series of activities is very important when trying to determine the resource level necessary to create deterrence. The table shows that as interdiction levels increase, the deterrent effect is significantly greater than a one-to-one correlation. In fact, with a probability of interdiction of only 40 percent, an 80 percent or greater level of deterrence can be obtained. The size of the population interviewed warrants a 90-percent confidence level in the findings. This study reveals that the level necessary to create deterrence is significantly less than many might suppose. Also note in Figure 1 that smugglers feel their associates are higher risk takers than the smuggler answering the questionnaire. Thus it takes only a forty percent probability of interdiction to create an 80 percent deterrence rate among respondents who claim to be more prudent than other smugglers. That is a significantly smaller capability than that which would be necessary to create a 100 percent interdiction of the surveyed respondents.
14 But we cannot be too sanguine. The Coast Guard estimates that their current assets applied to maritime law enforcement interdiction creates an interdiction level of between 10 to 15 percent of smuggler traffic. The graph above indicates this effort creates a deterrence level somewhere over 20 percent, almost a one-to-one relationship.
With a significant increase in assets, about $1 Billion or more, the Coast Guard feels a 40 percent interdiction level can be achieved, 15 which would result in a projected deterrence level of 80-90 percent.
But such an infusion of additional assets is highly unlikely because of a lack of conviction in interdiction on the part of the American public. On this point, the comparison between military deterrence and maritime interdiction quickly diverge. The
American public is unwilling to accept a military that cannot protect our national sovereignty. We can debate whether the military is actually being resourced to meet the threats facing our national interests in the post Cold-War world. But what is incontestable is that the American people will provide whatever resources are necessary to protect our National sovereignty. The same cannot be said about smuggling, particularly drug smuggling. Vincent T. Bugliosi, who gained fame as the prosecutor of Charles Manson, recently declared about the drug war that "The emerging consensus in the country is that we are dealing with a hopeless situation, a war that cannot be won.
According to Peter Reuter, chief drug policy expert for the Rand Corporation who has headed up comprehensive studies of the drug problem in America for the U.S.
Department of Defense:' The conventional wisdom is that nothing works. It's a view that comes out of despair. '" 16 The American public apparently is willing to tolerate a certain level of drug abuse and illegal immigration. As long as a given level is acceptable, there will be a corresponding levels of smuggling. Only when those levels of drug use and illegal alien entry rise too high will our concerns peak and tax dollars be spent. Bugliosi notes that in a 1989 survey the number one concern of Americans was drug use. By 1995 it had fallen I n to fourth. We now know that during the same period the United States witnessed a new surge in drug use, particularly marijuana, among high school students, up for the first 18 time in 20 years.
CONCLUSION:
The key elements of conventional military deterrence theory are applicable to maritime law enforcement interdiction. The elements identified in conventional military deterrence theory are the same necessary to create deterrence in maritime law enforcement interdiction. Perhaps these parallels emerge because maritime law enforcement is more closely related to military operations than to other law enforcement operations.
If we believe that we can deter aggression through military power and if the same elements of deterrence exist in conventional military deterrence and maritime law enforcement interdiction then we must believe we can deter maritime smuggling through law enforcement power. The only element that doesn't exist in maritime law enforcement interdiction today is sufficient capability necessary to create an acceptable level of deterrence.
We could deter smugglers from bringing their contraband into our country, just as we deter any other nation from aggression against us. If the Coast Guard estimate of a billion dollars investment produces sufficient assets to create a 40% interdiction rate, the corresponding deterrence effect would be an 80% decrease in maritime smuggling. This might directly translate to less drugs on our streets, but it might not. Smugglers are some of the most adaptive businessmen in the world. Closing down the maritime smuggling routes will put additional pressure on the land and air smuggling routes. But deterrence success in the maritime region could lead to the evaluation and implementation of similar practices on both land and sea smuggling routes finally making the cost of smuggling not worth the benefit.
The implications of the dramatic cause and effect relationship created through deterrence demand serious consideration in a period when we are experiencing a resurgence in drug use among our teenagers.
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